I came across an English-language article from Mainichi Shimbun when I was checking my twitter account. Just out of curiosity, I clicked the link. The article was about the failure of the Japanese Prime Minister’s office to take any action based on the prediction of meltdowns. I then also clicked the link to the original article in Japanese. To my surprise, the connotations in the two articles were quite different. Is this just a case of Lost in Translation? In any case, I found the discrepancies interesting enough that decided to share my observation.
The difference in the titles summarizes the difference in the nuances of the two versions.
The title for the English version is “PM's office failed to use data predicting Fukushima power loss, meltdowns.” It clearly suggests that it was the Prime Minister’s office, which failed to use the available data to protect Fukushima residents.
The title of the original Japanese version, however, is different. “福島第１原発：炉心予測、官邸活用せず 保安院管理ずさん” can be translated as “PM’s office did not act on the prediction of meltdown in Fukushima Daiichi due to the NISA’s poor data handling.” (NISA stands for the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency.) The Japanese language article blames the NISA more strongly for its failure to alert the Prime Minister’s Office more explicitly.
I’m too lazy to translate the whole of the Japanese original article, but let me compare the most important sections of the two articles.
The English-language version goes as following:
NISA handed the predictions to the Prime Minister's Office at around 10:45 p.m. on March 11 and again shortly after midnight. NISA sent the data on the No. 3 reactor to the Prime Minister's Office about 20 minutes after receiving it from JNES (the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization) around 6:30 a.m. on March 13.
However, the government did not use the data in its disaster response measures. Yoshinori Moriyama, NISA deputy director-general for nuclear accident measures, told a news conference on Sept. 2, "The data were not used because they were not based on facts."
The Japanese original version says:
同日午後１０時４５分ごろと１２日午前０時過ぎ、危機管理センターに常駐していた保安院職員を通じ内閣府の職員に手 渡した。３号機については１３日午前６時半ごろに届いたデータを同様の方法で約２０分後に官邸に届けたという。
A NISA personnel stationed in the Crisis Management Center(Nuclear Safety Agency) handed the predictions to a staffer from the Prime Minister's Office at around 10:45 p.m. on March 11 and again shortly after midnight. It is reported that NISA used the same method to deliver the data on the No. 3 reactor (to the PM’s Office) about 20 minutes after receiving it (from JNES) around 6:30 a.m. on March 13.
しかしこれらは周辺住民の避難指示などに活用されなかった。保安院の森山善範・原子力災害対策監は２日の会見で「事実に基づいたデータではないので活用を思い至らなかった」と釈明した。
However, the data were not used to evacuate residents near the nuclear power plant. Yoshinori Moriyama, NISA deputy director-general for nuclear accident measures, justified their actions at a news conference on Sept. 2, "the (prediction) data were not based on facts, so it did not occur to us to take any action based on them."
NOTE: The Japanese article does not say 'Moriyama told a news conference but uses a more value-laden expression 'Moriyama justified their actions.' This makes a Japanese reader think that NISA had done something wrong prompting Moriyama to justify their actions.
NOTE: The Japanese article does not say 'Moriyama told a news conference but uses a more value-laden expression 'Moriyama justified their actions.' This makes a Japanese reader think that NISA had done something wrong prompting Moriyama to justify their actions.
So what's the conclusion? Small differences in expressions can lead to very different interpretations. As consumers of news, we need to be aware of this. That said, my take is that no one in the Japanese government cared about the safety of the residents.
Below are the full texts of the English and Japanese versions of the article.
PM's office failed to use data predicting Fukushima power loss, meltdowns
(Mainichi Japan) September 3, 2011
In the hours after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, the Prime Minister's Office failed to take advantage of up-to-date analysis of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant that projected both power failures and subsequent core meltdowns, according to the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA).
NISA released the results of analysis on the Fukushima nuclear reactors using the Emergency Report Support System (ERSS) on Sept. 2 -- about six months after the analysis was conducted right after the magnitude-9 earthquake struck. The analysis predicted the loss of power and subsequent nuclear meltdowns at the No. 1, 2 and 3 reactors at the plant before they occurred.
NISA sent the analysis on the No. 2 and 3 reactors to the Prime Minister's Office, but the office did not use the information either to help plot containment measures or to initiate a swift evacuation of local communities. The agency did not send the results of the No. 1 reactor analysis.
According to NISA, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), which developed the ERSS, activated the system just after the quake. Based on the assumption of a complete loss of power at the plant, JNES predicted how the water levels, pressure and temperatures would change at the No. 1, 2 and 3 reactors.
The JNES sent the data on the No. 2 reactor to NISA around 9:30 p.m. on March 11. Based on the data, NISA officials projected a chain of events remarkably true to those that were to unfold at the plant, such as, "At 22:50, reactor cores will be exposed; At 24:50, fuel meltdown." NISA handed the predictions to the Prime Minister's Office at around 10:45 p.m. on March 11 and again shortly after midnight. NISA sent the data on the No. 3 reactor to the Prime Minister's Office about 20 minutes after receiving it from JNES around 6:30 a.m. on March 13.
However, the government did not use the data in its disaster response measures. Yoshinori Moriyama, NISA deputy director-general for nuclear accident measures, told a news conference on Sept. 2, "The data were not used because they were not based on facts."
Based on assumed amounts of radioactive substances inferred from the predictions for the No. 1 reactor, NISA also projected the diffusion of nuclear substances using a system known as SPEEDI, or the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information. The agency did not, however, release the predictions immediately, and were in the end not used at all. NISA had previously said that SPEEDI was not functioning after the quake because of a complete loss of power.
福島第１原発：炉心予測、官邸活用せず 保安院管理ずさん
2011年9月2日 21時53分
http://mainichi.jp/select/today/news/20110903k0000m040137000c.html
経済産業省原子力安全・保安院は２日、東日本大震災当日、東京電力福島第１原発１～３号機で全電源喪失などを想定し炉心溶融などを予測した「緊急 時対策支援システム（ＥＲＳＳ）」の解析結果を、約半年たって公表した。２、３号機の予測は官邸に送信したが活用されず、１号機は送信もしていなかった。 保安院の情報管理のずさんさが問われそうだ。
保安院によるとＥＲＳＳを開発した原子力安全基盤機構（ＪＮＥＳ）は３月１１日、保安院の依頼でＥＲＳＳを起動。同原発で全電源が断たれた事態を想定したパターンを使い、１～３号機の原子炉内の水位や圧力、温度が今後どう推移するかの予測結果を出した。
２号機のデータは１１日午後９時半ごろ、ＪＮＥＳから保安院に届いた。保安院の職員はデータを基に「２２時５０分 炉心露出 ２４時５０分 燃料 溶融」など予想される展開を文章にし、同日午後１０時４５分ごろと１２日午前０時過ぎ、危機管理センターに常駐していた保安院職員を通じ内閣府の職員に手 渡した。３号機については１３日午前６時半ごろに届いたデータを同様の方法で約２０分後に官邸に届けたという。しかしこれらは周辺住民の避難指示などに活用されなかった。保安院の森山善範・原子力災害対策監は２日の会見で「事実に基づいたデータではないので活用を思い至らなかった」と釈明した。
また、保安院は１号機の予測から導いた放射性物質の推定放出量を基に「緊急時迅速放射能影響予測ネットワークシステム（ＳＰＥＥＤＩ）」で拡散予 測を実施していた。しかしすぐには公表せず、避難指示などにも活用しなかった。保安院はこれまで「全電源喪失でＳＰＥＥＤＩが機能しなかった」と説明して いた。【久野華代】
【ことば】緊急時対策支援システム（ＥＲＳＳ）
原発事故の際、原子炉内の温度や圧力、水位などを即時に入手し、それに基づいて事態の進展や放射性物質の放出量を予測するために保安院が導入した コンピューターシステム。事故時、電力会社から集めた運転情報や放射線計測値などを収集し、さまざまな事故のパターンをデータベースから選んで計算する。 炉の状況や予測結果は、経済産業省などオンラインで結ばれた場所で閲覧できる。
